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Facing protectionism generated by trade disputes chna's post WTo blues
Wing Thye Woo and Geng Xiao
The escalation of friction between China and its trading partners chna's current account n the balance of payments has been n surplus snce 1994 and t has shown a clear upward trend, reachng Us$184 bllon n 2006, or 9 per cent of gross domestc product (GdP). As chna's captal account s also n persstent surplus because of the large nflows of foregn drect nvestment (Fdi) and captal controls on outflows, ts foregn exchange reserves reached Us$1.07 trllon n 2006-the largest n the world. chna also became the secondlargest holder of Us Treasury securtes, holdng as much as Us$353.6 bllon, tralng only Japan, whch holds Us$648.8 bllon.
At the tme of wrtng (June 2007), chna's overall trade surplus, the chna-Us trade surplus and the chna-eU trade surplus contnued to soar, 1 causng a marked escalaton n concern about chna's unfar tradng practces and the gross undervaluaton of the renmnb. in February 2007, the Us Trade representatve (UsTr) had filed a case wth the World Trade organzaton (WTo) aganst prohbted subsdes n chna. Ths acton was followed by two more WTo cases aganst chna n Aprl 2007-challengng market access restrctons on products of copyrght-ntensve ndustres and challengng weaknesses n the legal regme for protecton and enforcement of copyrghts and trademarks. 2 in order to apprecate adequately the hgh ntensty of the sound and the fury of the ant-chna rhetorc-and the global character of these crtcsms-t s worthwhle to quote a number of news reports from the barrage of press artcles on the trade mbalance ssue that appeared on 13 June 2007.
The Financial Times (2007a) reported Peter mandelson, the eU trade commssoner…called varous aspects of chna's trade polcy 'llogcal, ndefensble' and 'unacceptable and accused [chna] of dong nothng to ren n rampant counterfetng…mr mandelson also refused to grant chna market economy status…[because t had] fulfilled [only] one of five crtera. 4 The Straits Times (2007) of sngapore reported Peter mandelson proclamed that the… [eU] trade defict wth chna was no longer 'tolerable' and warned that relatons wth Bejng were now at a 'crossroads'…[Trade s] so skewed that the eU now exports more to swtzerland… than to the entre chnese market.
USA Today (2007) reported that [a] fter years of nconclusve skrmshng, trade tensons between the Unted states and chna are about to ntensfy. 'We are competng not only wth a country wth low wages but wth very hgh and heavy subsdes and a rggng of ther currency,' says rep. sander levn, d-mch., charman of the house trade subcommttee. 'i hate the term trade war because t s always used when you try to get a far break…sometmes pressure works. ' in confirmaton of the growng percepton of-and deepenng dssatsfacton about-unfar chnese tradng practces, the meda on 13 June 2007 also contaned reports on the actons beng undertaken by the Bush admnstraton and the chnese government to forestall protectonsm.
The Standard (2007) of hong kong reported Us lawmakers plan to ntroduce legslaton today seekng to pressure chna to rase the value of the yuan to stem a balloonng trade mbalance… sponsored by democratc senator charles schumer, the bll wll lay out the Us response whenever countres 'unfarly undervalue ther currency'. currently, there are half a dozen measures before the Us congress amed at chna, ncludng proposals to apply sanctons unless t allows the yuan to apprecate by at least 10 per cent.
The Wall Street Journal (2007b) reported [t] urnng asde growng congressonal anger over the Us trade defict wth chna, Presdent George Bush's admnstraton today wll reject demands that t formally accuse Bejng of 'manpulatng' ts currency to gve chnese companes an edge over Amercan busnesses. 'There mght be an ntal sgh of relef n the markets that the Treasury has not taken a more confrontatonal lne, but protectonst pressures are only lkely to buld', Julan Jessop, chef nternatonal economst at captal economcs n london, warned clents n a note yesterday. meanwhle Bejng took steps yesterday apparently amed, at least n part, at defusng Us concerns. chnese authortes permtted an unusually large rse n ts tghtly controlled currency.
The International Herald Tribune (2007) events then moved quckly. on 14 June 2007, senators max Baucus (democrat from montana), charles e. Grassley (republcan from iowa), charles e. schumer (democrat from New York) and lndsey Graham (republcan from south carolna) ntroduced legslaton 'to punsh chna f t dd not change ts polcy of ntervenng n currency markets to keep the exchange value of the currency, the yuan, low' (New York Times 2007).
on 19 June 2007, the internatonal monetary Fund (imF) adopted a new country survellance framework that set out …a catch-all oblgaton on countres not to adopt polces that undermne the stablty of the nternatonal system, and lsts a set of objectve crtera that wll be used to ndcate whether a country s complyng wth ts commtments. Warnng lghts wll nclude large-scale currency nterventon, the accumulaton of reserves and 'fundamental exchange rate msalgnment'-a term that mrrors language n a bll before the Us congress that would mpose penaltes on natons that fal to correct such msalgnments. rodrgo rato, managng drector of the imF, sad: 'Ths decson s good news for the imF reform programme and good news for the cause of multlateralsm… [because ths new framework] gves clear gudance to our members on how they should run ther exchange rate polces, on what s acceptable to the nternatonal communty and what s not' (Financial Times 2007b).
The above developments were warnngs that chna, europe and the Unted states could be marchng towards a trade war. in ths chapter, we examne the reasons for the trade frcton wth chna and propose polces to reduce that frcton. our dscusson wll focus on four questons 1 What are the problems caused by trade mbalances?
2 What are the problems revealed by the appearance of trade mbalances?
3 is a large yuan apprecaton the best cure for trade frcton? There are two major problems wth the scott (2007) study. Frst, the overall unemployment rate n the Unted states dd not grow n lne ether wth the wdenng overall Us trade defict or wth the wdenng Us-chna trade defict. The average unemployment rate of 4.9 per cent n the 1998-2006 perod was lower than the average unemployment rates n the prevous perods of 1980-88 and 1989-97, whch were 7.5 per cent and 6 per cent respectvely. in realty, the Us economy was a hghly successful job-creaton machne n the 1997-2006 perod.
second, n the face of the strong demand for labour n the Us economy durng the perod of growng trade defict, a substantal amount of the so-called job losses could have been voluntary departures by workers-rather than nvoluntary dsplacement of workers-from mport-competng ndustres that pad low wages or had potentally low wage growth n the future.
The more sophstcated complant aganst the growng trade defict s that the dsplacement of workers adds to the downward pressure on Us wages created by globalsaton. Ths downward wage pressure comes from the post 1990 ntegraton of the labour force n the former sovet Unon, inda and chna nto the nternatonal dvson of labour. The number of workers already engaged n the nternatonal dvson of labour was 1.08 bllon n 1990, and the combned labour force of the former sovet Unon, inda and chna was 1.23 bllon ( Table 1 ). The dvson of labour n 1990 was certanly an unnatural one because half of the world's workforce had been kept out of t voluntarly by the autarkc polces of the former sovet Unon, inda and chna.
The economc solaton of the sovet bloc started crumblng when the new non-communst soldarty government of Poland began marketsaton and nternatonalsaton of ts economy on 1 January 1990. The economc transton and poltcal dsntegraton of the sovet bloc became rreversble when Presdent Bors Yeltsn replaced mkhal Gorbachev as the unambguous leader of russa n August 1991 and mplemented market-orented reforms n January 1992. 6 For the chnese élte, the events n the sovet Unon confirmed that there dd not exst a thrd way n the captalsm versus socalsm debate. in early 1992, deng Xaopng led a successful campagn to put chna firmly on the path of convergence to a prvate market economy Woo 2000, 2003) . Today, under the headng of a socalst market economy wth chnese characterstcs, the chnese consttuton gves prvate property the same legal status as publc property, and the chnese communst Party accepts captalsts as members.
in 1991, inda faced a balance-of-payments crss, and t responded by gong well beyond admnstraton of the standard correctve macroeconomc medcne of fiscal monetary tghtenng and exchange-rate devaluaton nto comprehensve adjustments of mcroeconomc ncentves. The trade regme was deregulated sgnficantly, restrctons on foregn nvestment were relaxed, reform of the bankng sector and the captal markets was ntated, and dvestment of publc enterprses and tax reforms were announced (Acharya 2004) .
A decade after the start of nternatonalsaton, the number of workers nvolved n the nternatonal economc system had ncreased to 2.67 bllon n 2000 (wth 1.36 bllon workers from the former sovet Unon, inda and chna) ( Table 4 .1). The heckscher-ohln model would predct that ths doublng of world labour-acheved by brngng n cheaper labour from the former sovet Unon, inda and chna-would lower the relatve prce of labour-ntensve goods and hence reduce real wages n ndustralsed economes.
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The fact that Us captal could now move abroad to set up producton facltes n the economes of the former sovet Unon, inda and chna to servce the Us market provded another channel (besdes the cross-border movement of goods) for globalsaton to depress Us wage rates. it s mportant to note that the mposton of a very hgh Us tarff would not only drastcally curb mports from the former sovet Unon, inda and chna, t would also radcally reduce ths type of Fdi flow from the Unted states to the former sovet Unon, inda and chna. The nconvenent fact s, however, that the Us real wage has not fallen. one possble explanaton to reconcle the theoretcal predcton wth the real outcome s the remarkably hgh Us productvty growth snce the late 1980s, perhaps enabled n large part by the nformaton and communcatons technology revoluton. Ths productvty growth was hgh enough to prevent the real wage from declnng but not enough to keep t growng at the same rate as GdP growth-and the economc mpact of globalsaton s manfested n a dmnshed labour share of GdP.
Whle the heckscher-ohln model does provde a coherent mechansm for globalsaton to lower the labour share of Us ncome and to wden the dstrbuton of Us wages, the nconvenent truth s that chna cannot be blamed as the most nfluental factor n these two wage outcomes, even though chna accounted for 764 mllon of the combned labour force of the former sovet Unon, inda and chna of 1.38 bllon n 2000. chna s not the man culprt because there have been three other, ndependent developments that have had mportant consequences for Us wages.
Frst, there have been technologcal nnovatons that have substtuted captal for labour-for example, fewer secretares are needed because answerng machnes can now convert messages nto voce files and emal them to the travellng professonals. Technologcal nnovatons have also transformed many of what were tradtonally non-tradable servces nto tradable servces, allowng jobs to be outsourced to foregn servce provders. For example, the nformaton and communcatons technology revoluton has allowed offshore call centres to handle questons from Us customers, offshore accountants to process Us-based transactons and offshore medcal techncans to read the X-rays of Us patents. 8 second, there have been nsttutonal changes that attenuated the labour share of ncome. Unon membershp has declned, reducng the barganng power of labour. There has also been an upward shft n the compensaton norms for hgh-level executves, often usng vehcles such as stock optons, whch n effect make them co-owners of the company. Ths could reflect a combnaton of a shft n socal atttudnal norms and more colluson between managers and ther boards.
Thrd, there was ncreased mmgraton nto the Unted states (before 2001), especally a dsproportonate nward mmgraton of low-sklled labour. 10 Based on a partal revew of the lterature, our assessment s that the pressure that s preventng Us wages (especally of unsklled labour) from rsng n lne wth GdP growth can be roughly decomposed among the varous factors as follows
• 70-80 per cent of the downward wage pressure s from labour-substtutng technologcal nnovatons, and wage-weakenng nsttutonal changes
• 5 -10 per cent of the downward wage pressure s from nward mmgraton
• 15-20 per cent of the downward pressure s from mport competton and the relocaton of manufacturng actvtes abroad.
in short, the popular outcry n the Unted states and the european Unon aganst chna's trade surpluses s msplaced. even f chna's trade balance were zero, the pans of structural adjustment and ncome redstrbuton caused by technologcal nnovatons, nsttutonal changes, globalsaton and mmgraton would stll be there. The addtonal pan from the ncremental structural adjustment caused by the wdenng trade defict s mnor n comparson.
What are the problems revealed by the appearance of trade imbalances?
Before dscussng the economc problems n chna and the Unted states that generated the trade mbalances, we should menton a troublng basc data ssue: there s strong dsagreement about the sze of the Us-chna trade defict. Fgure 4.1 shows that the chnese figure for the blateral defict n 2006 (Us$145 bllon) was only 57.7 per cent of the Us figure (Us$251 bllon). 11 The huge gap between these two estmates n 2006 was a huge mprovement n accuracy from the past n two ways. Frst, the gap was usually much larger n prevous years: for example, the 1993 chnese estmate of the trade defict was only 25.6 per cent of the Us estmate. second, the recent perod s one n whch the two countres could agree whether the blateral balance was n surplus or n defict! Throughout the 1983-92 perod, the chnese data showed chna to be runnng a defict n ts trade wth the Us but the Us data showed a surplus.
Gven these wldly dfferent measures of the sze of the blateral trade mbalance, t s only to be expected that each sde would regard the blateral trade mbalance wth a dfferent degree of concern. The prmary reason for the dscrepancy between the chnese and Us estmates s the dfferent natonal treatment of Us-chna trade that goes through hong kong.
12 drawng on the work of Feenstra et al. (1999) for the analyss n ths chapter, we wll measure the Us-chna trade balance as the smple average between the Us estmate and the chnese estmate, as reported n the imF's Direction of Trade Statistics database. 13 Fgure 4.2 dsplays three tems: chna's overall trade balance, the chna-Us trade balance and the chna-eU trade balance. chna has been runnng a surplus on ts Us trade snce 1986, a surplus on ts eU trade snce 1997 and a surplus on ts overall trade snce 1994. snce 1986-except for the four years assocated wth an economc downturn n chna (1990, 1991, 1997 and 1998 )-the blateral surplus wth the Unted states exceeded chna's overall trade surplus, meanng that chna was runnng massve deficts n ts trade wth some of ts other tradng partners.
The changng configuraton of chna's blateral trade balances reflects manly the steady expanson of producton networks nto chna. in ths new geographcal dvson of the producton of components and of the producton stages n manufacturng, chna usually makes the cheaper components and assembles the final products by combnng the domestcally produced components wth mported components. The fast transfer of manufacturng and assembly operatons to chna from Japan, Tawan and south korea translates drectly nto hgh growth n the chna-Us trade surplus because ths transfer reduces the Japan-Us trade surplus and the south korean-Us trade surplus correspondngly. in short, the chna-Us trade defict could be reduced by transferrng the assembly operatons of korean, Tawanese, Japanese and european producton networks to Vetnam, but the Vetnam-Us trade defict would then ncrease, leavng the overall Us trade balance unchanged. chna's chronc and growng overall trade surplus reveals a deep-seated problem n ts economy: ts dysfunctonal financal system. Ths problem s revealed by the aggregate-level accountng dentty that the overall current account balance (of whch, n chna, the overall trade account s the bggest part) s determned by the fiscal poston of the government, and by the savngsnvestment decsons of the state-controlled enterprse (sce) sector and the prvate sector.
14 specfically,
where cA s the current account n the balance of payments. The chnese fiscal poston (T-G) has for the past decade been a small defict, so t was not the cause for the swellng current account surpluses n the 2000s. The current account surplus exsts because the sum of savngs by sces and the prvate sector exceeds the sum of ther nvestment expendtures. The current account surplus has expanded steadly because the non-government savngs rate has been rsng steadly. We wll argue later that there s a lnk between the exstence of the current account surplus and the growth of the surplus. Why has chna's fnancal system faled to translate the savngs nto nvestments? such an outcome was not always the case. Before 1994, the voracous absorpton of bank loans by sces to nvest recklessly kept the current account mostly negatve and the creaton of non-performng loans hgh. When the government mplemented strcter controls on the state-owned banks from 1994 onwards (for example, by removng top bank officals whenever ther bank lent more than ts credt quota or allowed the non-performng loan rato to ncrease too rapdly), the state-owned banks slowed the growth of loans to sces. Ths cut-back created an excess of savngs because the state-owned bankdomnated financal sector dd not then channel the released savngs (whch were also ncreasng) to finance the nvestment of the prvate sector. Ths falure n financal ntermedaton by the state-owned banks s qute understandable. Frstly, the legal status of prvate enterprses was, untl recently, lower than that of state-owned enterprses; and, secondly, there was no relable way to assess the balance sheets of the prvate enterprses, whch were naturally eager to escape taxaton. The upshot was that the resdual excess savngs leaked abroad n the form of the current account surplus. inadequate financal ntermedaton has made developng chna a captal-exportng country! Ths perverse current account outcome s not new. Tawan had exactly ths problem untl the md 1980s when all Tawanese banks were state owned and were operated accordng to the cvl servce regulaton that the loan officer had to repay any bad loan that he had approved. The result was a massve falure n financal ntermedaton, whch caused Tawan's current account surplus to be 21 per cent of GdP n 1986. The reason why chna has not been producng the gargantuan current account surpluses seen n Tawan n the md 1980s s because of the large amount of sce nvestments.
Why s the savngs rate of the non-government sector rsng? The combned savngs of the state-owned enterprse and non-state-owned enterprse sector rose from 20 per cent n 1978 to 30 per cent n 1987, and then went above 45 per cent after 2004. in dscussons on the rse of the savngs rate, a common vew s that the rse reflects the uncertanty about the future that many state-owned enterprse workers feel n the face of wdespread prvatsaton of loss-makng state-owned enterprses. We find ths explanaton ncomplete because t seems that there has also been a rse n the rural savngs rate even though rural resdents have lttle to fear about the loss of jobs n the state-owned enterprse sector because none of them are employed there. 15 We see two general changes that have caused urban and rural savngs rates to rse sgnficantly. The first s ncreased worres about the future. The steady declne n state subsdes to medcal care, housng, loss-makng enterprses and educaton, and msmanagement of penson funds by the state, have led people to save more to nsure aganst future bad luck (for example, sckness, job loss), to buy ther own lodgng, buld up nest eggs for retrement and nvest n ther chldren.
The second change s the secular mprovement n the offical chnese atttude towards market captalsm. Gven the hgh rate of return to captal, ths ncreasngly busness-frendly atttude of the communst Party of chna has no doubt encouraged rural and urban resdents to save for nvestment: that s, greater optmsm about the future has spawned nvestment-motvated savng. 16 our nvestment-motvated savngs hypothess s not new. Accordng to Jeffrey Wllamson (1988) , the hstorcal record of Western europe and North Amerca shows that 'nvestment demand seems to have been the drvng force behnd prvate savng and accumulaton, past and present'. in our explanatons for the exstence and the growth of the current account surpluses, there s a common element: chna's financal system. The fact s that savngs behavour s not ndependent of the sophstcaton of the financal system. An advanced financal system wll have a varety of financal nsttutons that enable poolng of rsks by provdng medcal nsurance, penson nsurance and unemployment nsurance; and transform savngs nto educaton loans, housng loans and other types of nvestment loans to the prvate sector. Ceteris paribus, the more sophstcated a financal system, the lower the savngs rate-a proposton that finds formal statstcal support n lu and Woo (1994) and Woo and lu (1995) . chna generates the current account surplus because of nadequate financal ntermedaton, and the surplus grows over tme because the dysfunctonal financal system fals to pool rsks to reduce uncertanty-nduced savngs and fals to provde loans to reduce nvestment-motvated savng (Fgure 4.2).
The overall Us trade balance has been n defict at least snce 1980, and t has always been much bgger than the Us-chna trade balance (Fgure 4.3). Ths pattern of mbalances suggests three conclusons. Frst, the Us-chna trade defict s only 22.4 per cent of the overall Us trade defict, so even f the blateral trade balance were brought to zero by tarffs amed at chna, the overall trade defict would stll be large. second, the blateral trade defict surplus s created by the same factors that are causng the overall trade defict: the large annual budget defict created by the tax cuts enacted by the Bush admnstraton n 2001 and the post 2001 growth n defence expendture. Thrd, the hghly sophstcated Us financal system (whch poneered the sub-prme mortgage market and corporate junk bonds to enable consumpton and nvestment) has lowered the Us prvate savngs rate.
clearly, the sustaned nature of the overall Us trade defict was possble only because foregn lenders had fath n the growth prospects of the Us economy, and because the east Asan central banks were wllng to hold an ncreasng amount of Us financal nstruments. The paradox s why the Us congress s so concerned about trade deficts when foregners have such confidence n the economc future of the Unted states. Both groups cannot be rght. Goldsten (2007) offered the opnon to the Us congress that the …renmnb (rmB) s now grossly undervalued-on the order of 30 percent or more aganst an average of chna's tradng partners and 40 percent or more aganst the Us dollar…[The] Us Treasury has refused to label chna as a 'currency manpulator' despte overwhelmng evdence to the contrary and the managng drector of the internatonal monetary Fund contnues to reject the role of global umpre for exchange rate polces that was lad out for the Fund n ts charter. chna should delver rght away a meanngful 'down payment' of a 10-15 per cent apprecaton of the rmB from ts current level. Falure by chna to drastcally reduce ts large-scale, one-way nterventon n the exchange market should result n a findng of 'currency manpulaton' n the Treasury's may 2007 report to the Us congress…Fnally, the imF should return to ts roots by takng up n earnest the role that ts founders set out for t as the global umpre for exchange rate polces.
We wll use the format of queston and answer to analyse the queston posed n the ttle of ths part of the paper and to assess the valdty of the above assertons.
dd chna export deflaton, as kuroda and kawa (2003) clamed?
The fundamental problem wth kuroda and kawa's clam s that t s mpossble to blame Japan's deflaton on chna's deflaton because the tmng s wrong. Japan's deflaton started wth the burstng of the stock market cum real estate bubble n 1992, whch was well before chna's trade account surpluses started to soar n the 2000s. if anythng, trade wth chna snce 2003 has been an mportant stmulus to Japanese economc recovery. sustaned hgh chnese nvestment spendng has sucked n large amounts of ntermedate nputs, machnery and captal equpment from Japan.
Would a yuan apprecaton reduce global mbalances, as Bergsten (2007) 
clamed?
There s lttle doubt that a large apprecaton of the yuan aganst the Us dollar-say, 40 per cent, as suggested by Goldsten (2007) -could elmnate the Us-chna trade defict as well as chna's overall trade surplus. But ths move would only hurt chna and would not 'save' the world. Ceteris paribus, n the aftermath of a 40 per cent yuan apprecaton, foregn companes producng n chna for the G7 markets would move ther operatons to other Asan economes (such as Vetnam and Thaland) and export from there, and G7 mporters would start mportng the same goods from other Asan countres nstead. in the absence of a collectve apprecaton of all Asan currences, a yuan apprecaton would only reconfigure the geographcal dstrbuton of the global mbalances, not elmnate them.
how could a collectve regonal apprecaton aganst the Us dollar be acheved?
it would be nave to assume that Asan currences tend to move closely together when one of them moves a large amount, such as 40 per cent. The last tme the Asan currences moved together by a large amount was durng the Asan financal crss of 1997-98, and chna dd not jon n despte many predctons to the contrary. should the Us government now expand ts currency apprecaton campagn serally to other east Asan countres and undertake a 'surge' n exchange rate actvsm on any country that pushes back? For many reasons, ths would not be a desrable nternatonal economc strategy for the Unted states. 18 Would a large, smultaneous collectve apprecaton of the Asan currences be an unambguous gan for the Unted states?
We are not sure. immedate cessaton of the foregn financng of the Us savngs gap would translate nto an mmedate zero current account balance, and ths would requre an mmedate ncrease n Us exports and/or an mmedate decrease n Us mports. exports would ncrease quckly only f there were substantal excess producton capacty or f there were a substantal drop n domestc demand that freed up the domestc goods for sale abroad. imports would decrease quckly only f there were excess producton capacty (to enable replacement of mports) or f there were a substantal drop n domestc demand that reduced the use of consumer goods and nputs. snce there s no substantal excess producton capacty n the Us economy today, the mmedate elmnaton of the current account defict would requre a huge drop n domestc demand, whch would have ts orgn n a large negatve wealth shock, possbly n the form of a stock market collapse or an nflatonary spke. 19 Would the absence of a yuan apprecaton cause hgh nflaton n chna, as Goldsten and lardy (2003) clamed?
The growth of chnese money supply has not slowed drastcally despte the heghtenng of ant-nflaton rhetorc by the chnese government n response to the contnued hgh growth of nvestment expendture. has the chnese government lost control of ts money supply, as a number of analysts have warned? Not at all. The speculatve nflows and growth n foregn exchange reserves cannot expand the money supply wthout the agreement of the People's Bank of chna (PBc). As well as sterlsaton through open-market operatons, chna has the use of credt quotas on bank lendng. The fact s that all chnese banks are state controlled, and ther hgh-rankng executves are apponted by the state. Gven the choce between maxmsng bank profits or heedng orders from the prme mnster's office, the bank chefs can always be counted on to choose the latter. There s no queston about the communst Party of chna losng control of the money supply snce 2002. money supply growth n 2005-07 dd not slow markedly because chna chose not to enforce the credt quotas strngently. Frst, the nflaton rate, although rsng, s stll low. second, t s good poltcs to have a boomng economy n the perod leadng up to the mportant seventeenth Party congress n November 2007, whch wll ratfy mportant personnel appontments for the next five years.
What s the correct level for the exchange rate?
The Economist magazne constructs a purchasng power party (PPP) exchange rate based on the prces of Bg mac hamburgers sold n dfferent countres. in 2006, t cost 10.4 yuan to buy a Bg mac n chna and Us$3.15 n the Unted states, so the PPP exchange rate was 3.3 yuan per Us dollar n 2006, compared wth the actual (nomnal) exchange rate of 8 yuan per Us dollar. is t, therefore, meanngful to say that the chnese exchange rate was undervalued by almost 60 per cent n 2006? The answer s no, because the prces of the hamburgers ncluded non-tradable nputs, and the prces of non-tradables were lower n chna than n the Unted states. in general, the prces of non-tradables are lower n developng economes than n ndustralsed economes because labour costs are lower n the former. Wth economc development, the prces of non-tradables n the developng economes wll rse to brng the prce rato of non-tradables to tradables closer to the prce rato n the ndustralsed economy.
To see that the gap between the usual PPP exchange rate and the actual exchange rate reflects the development gap between the two countres, we first make the followng defintons a) definng the consumer prce ndex n chna and the Unted states c) The dfference between the ndustralsed and the developng economy s that the relatve prce of non-tradables s hgher n the former.
We can now derve the followng relatonshp between the PPP exchange rate and the actual exchange rate
The above exercse shows that t s conceptually dfficult to determne the 'correctness' of a country's exchange rate on the bass of PPP exchange rates. The actual (nomnal) exchange rate of a developng economy wll always be undervalued n relaton to the PPP exchange rate, and t s ludcrous to demand that the government of the developng economy set ts exchange rate equal to the PPP exchange rate (because ths s not a sustanable polcy).
one meanngful definton of the 'correct exchange rate' s that t s the 'market-clearng exchange rate': the exchange rate that s generated by the foregn exchange markets n the absence of nterventon by any central bank. The fact that the People's Bank of chna has been accumulatng foregn reserves durng every perod means that the yuan s undervalued accordng to ths definton. What would happen, however, f chna were to go further n ts marketsaton of foregn exchange transactons by removng ts captal controls? dversficaton of asset portfolos by prvate chnese agents would surely result n a great outflow of funds, possbly causng the yuan to deprecate. in such a case, the present exchange rate of 8 yuan per Us dollar would be overvalued compared wth the 'complete free-market exchange rate'. of course, no one knows whether the complete free-market exchange rate would be hgher or lower than 8 yuan per Us dollar.
suppose the value of the complete free-market exchange rate was 6.5 yuan per Us dollar and the market-clearng exchange rate wth controls on captal outflows was 4.5 yuan per Us dollar-and suppose the government stops nterventon mmedately and then removes captal controls a few years later, after t has strengthened the supervson, management and techncal capablty of the domestc financal nsttutons. one plausble result of ths partcular twostep market lberalsaton (whch we call opton A) would be apprecaton to 4.5 yuan per dollar on cessaton of foregn exchange market nterventon followed by deprecaton to 6.5 yuan per dollar on removal of the captal controls.
suppose chna adopts another form of two-step lberalsaton (opton B), ncremental apprecaton of the yuan and removal of the captal controls after a few years. opton B s better than opton A because the exchange rate overshootng n opton A creates an unnecessary to-and-fro movement n resources. As mentoned, the removal of captal controls could very well cause the yuan to deprecate past 8 yuan per dollar, say, to 9.5 yuan per dollar, meanng that opton A would result n very severe exchange rate overshootng compared to opton B.
in effect, the chnese government has been mplementng a form of opton B snce July 2005. in our opnon, the chnese government has chosen a speed of exchange rate adjustment that s too slow, causng the yuan to deprecate sgnficantly aganst the euro. We recommend that the chnese government ncreases the speed of the yuan apprecaton, but not n the form of an mmedate dscrete 10-15 per cent apprecaton as advocated by Goldsten (2007). 20 in our opnon, the nstnctve calls by some economsts for the use of the exchange-rate mechansm to solve chna's external mbalance s only partally correct. Gven chna's captal controls, a freely floatng currency regme could mean a value for the yuan that would be greatly over-apprecated compared wth what ts value would be under free captal flows, and could therefore reduce economc growth sgnficantly. 21 Freeng captal flows s not, however, an opton at ths tme. Gven the weakness of the balance sheets of chna's state-owned banks and the consderable embezzlement of state assets that has occurred-and the experence of the east Asan financal crss-we advse aganst allowng the free movement of captal n the short term.
The correct way to thnk about exchange-rate management s to analyse the ssue wthn the context of overall macroeconomc management and not just n regard to ts mpact on the balance of payments. it s lkely that there are alternatve combnatons of macroeconomc polces that would produce results superor to the one generated by apprecatng the yuan alone. The general pont s that because the balance of payments s only one of the man outcomes of concern 22 and the exchange rate s only one of the ways to affect the balance of payments, 23 t s seldom the optmum to concentrate exclusvely on one polcy target (whch does not domnate the other polcy targets n mportance) and then to employ only one polcy tool (whch s chosen dosyncratcally) to acheve that target.
What is to be done?
The real source of the anxetes that have gven rse to the present Us obsesson wth yuan apprecaton s not the large trade mbalances but the large amount of structural adjustment necesstated by the acceleraton of globalsaton and of labour-savng technologcal progress. dollar deprecaton and trade barrers wll slow the process of structural adjustment but wll not stop t because the man drver of structural adjustment n the Unted states s technologcal progress. The optmal soluton s a polcy package that emphasses multlateral acton to acheve several mportant objectves. it s bad economcs and bad poltcs to dwell on just one regon (chna alone must change), to dwell on just one nstrument (yuan apprecaton alone) and to dwell entrely on one target (external mbalance).
We start by statng what should be done n the Unted states. congress should qucken the reducton n fiscal mbalance, and expand trade adjustment programs, especally those that upgrade the sklls of younger workers. The Trade Adjustment Assstance (TAA) program stll functons nadequately after ts overhaul n 2002. lael Branard (2007) reported that [p] artcpaton has remaned surprsngly low, thanks n part to confusng department of labor nterpretatons and practces that ultmately deny benefits to roughly three-quarters of workers who are certfied as elgble for them. TAA has helped fewer than 75,000 new workers per year, whle denyng more than 40 per cent of all employers' pettons. And remarkably, the department of labor has nterpreted the TAA statute as excludng the growng number of servces workers dsplaced by trade. Between 2001 and , an average of only 64 per cent of partcpants found jobs whle they partcpated n TAA. And earnngs on the new job were more than 20 per cent below those pror to dsplacement. The TAA program s n clear need of further mprovement. Branard's (2007) proposal for the establshment of wage nsurance s an excellent way to brng the Us socal safety net more n lne wth the type of structural adjustments drven by globalsaton and technologcal changes.
What s to be done n chna? The obvous short-term polcy package has three components. Frst, the steady process of yuan apprecaton begun n July 2005 should be quckened-and should be used more aggressvely as an antnflaton nstrument. second, mport lberalsaton should be accelerated (for example, commtments made n negotatons for WTo membershp, such as ntellectual property rghts protecton, should be mplemented) and expanded beyond WTo specficatons.
The thrd component of the short-term polcy package s to have an expansonary fiscal polcy (such as rural nfrastructure nvestments) to soak up excess savngs, wth an emphass on mport-ntensve nvestments (for example, buyng aeroplanes and sendng students abroad). There must be tme lmts put on the expanded publc works and sce nvestments because, n the long term, ncreased publc nvestments could follow an ncreasngly rent-seekng path that s wasteful (for example, buldng a second bg brdge to a low-populated sland to benefit a poltcally connected constructon company, as happened n Japan), and the ncreased sce nvestments could convert themselves nto non-performng loans at the state-owned banks.
it s now common to hear calls for chna to rebalance ts growth path by reducng savngs to ncrease consumpton. Ths advce on ncreasng consumpton cannot be wrong, however, consumpton n chna today s largely under the control of ndvdual famles and firms. They have probably already tred ther best to optmse ther consumpton gven all the constrants they face, and are unlkely to welcome the government tellng them how to spend ther money.
snce the health nsurance and socal securty networks n chna are n ther nfancy, many chnese people are choosng to save a great deal of money as a hedge aganst severe llness. in the absence of student-loan programs, famles are also choosng to save a great deal for ther chldren's educaton. many mddle-class chnese famles have bought property n antcpaton of captal gans but have refraned from movng nto the new property because roads, subways and schools for many newly developed resdental communtes are underdeveloped. These are ther best choces gven the structural and economc constrants on chnese socety. As a result, the consumpton of chnese households remans low and savngs rates reman hgh. All of these factors beg the queston, 'how can chna ncrease domestc consumpton? '. in the context of the above examples, the answers are qute straghtforward: buld an ntegrated health nsurance system; create student-loan and scholarshp programs; and buld more roads, subways and schools. 24 The optmal soluton to the problem of excess savng s not, however, for the government to absorb t by ncreasng ts budget defict but to establsh an mproved mechansm for coordnatng prvate savngs and prvate nvestments. establshment of a modern financal system wll not only acheve ths objectve, t wll enhance welfare and lower the savngs rate by poolng rsks through vehcles such as medcal and penson nsurance. in a nutshell, chna's man challenge today s to develop smoothly functonng financal, plannng and regulatory systems that can employ the remanng rural surplus labour (as ndcated by an average wage of about Us$120 per month for 480 mllon rural and mgrant workers) and surplus captal, whch now shows up n chna's sustaned current account surplus and rsng foregn exchange reserves.
The most mportant prorty for financal-sector development s the appearance and growth of compettve domestc prvate banks. As chna s requred by ts WTo accesson agreement to allow foregn banks to compete aganst ts stateowned banks on an equal bass by 2007, t would be akn to self-loathng not to allow the formaton of truly prvate banks of domestc orgn. There s no reason to favour foregn prvate banks over domestc prvate banks, and there s no reason why chna should not allow ts best financal mnds to compete wth-and acheve the same glorous success as-the best foregn financal mnds.
We therefore recommend that after the recaptalsaton of the bg four state banks, at least two of them should be broken nto several regonal banks, and the majorty of these regonal banks should be prvatsed. At the same tme, laws on the establshment of new banks should be loosened, and nterest rates deregulated. it s crucal, however, that financal-sector lberalsaton proceeds no faster than the development of the financal regulatory ablty of the state. even then, the danger of substtutng a financal crash for financal represson s real. A modern financal system requres a modern system of supervson and prudental regulaton for ts proper functonng.
it would be a good dea to sell a few of the regonal state banks to foregn banks. Ths would facltate the transfer of modern bankng technology to chnese banks. The more local staff the foregn bankers tran, the larger s the pool of future managers for chnese-owned banks. An accelerated process of promotng the growth of sound domestc prvate financal nsttutons and allowng the entry of foregn financal nsttutons would shorten the tme needed for shangha to assume ts rghtful place among the major nternatonal financal centres, and to contrbute to more efficent ntermedaton of the world's savngs.
An mportant part of financal reform should be promoton of the development of sound rural financal nsttutons. The government can usefully draw on the wealth of nternatonal experence wth varous schemes n developng economes to drect nvestment credt to rural areas. in partcular, we wsh to draw attenton to the successful indonesan experence of establshng a self-sustanng and profitable bankng system (the 'Unt desa' system) n the countrysde to provde a startng pont for dscussng how to accelerate financal development n rural chna. 25 chna should allow the appearance of new small-scale rural financal nsttutons that wll moblse local savngs to finance local nvestments as quckly as adequate prudental supervson can be put nto place.
The wdespread nternatonal attenton on the value of the yuan s possbly the first tme n nternatonal monetary hstory that the value of the currency of a developng economy has so greatly exercsed the finance mnstres and central banks of the largest ndustralsed economes for such a sustaned perod. Ths anomalous stuaton reveals two noteworthy ponts about chna's return to the nternatonal stage: t shows the sgnficant economc mpact that chna s already havng on the world; and t portends that the antcpated contnued fast growth of chna n the next two decades wll not only force more structural adjustments n other countres, t wll requre chna to assume a broader 'global system' perspectve n resolvng dsputes caused by crossborder spllovers from ts polces. The most mportant and obvous area for collaboraton between chna and ndustralsed economes at ths pont s workng together to further lberalse the multlateral free-trade system, and, at the mnmum, to prevent t beng eroded.
As chna contnues to grow rapdly, there s the unfortunate possblty that the range of nternatonal dsputes could expand-possbly n the medum term-to nclude nternatonal concerns about chna's publc health readness and envronmental protecton. hopefully, the world wll be more multlateral n ts approach to the soluton of these ssues rather than nsstng on a unlateral soluton by chna, as n the present case of the yuan.
Notes
1 At the end of may, the Natonal development and reform commsson predcted that 'chna's trade surplus wll swell to between Us$250 bllon to Us$300 bllon ths year, drven by prce compettveness and strong external demand. The surplus for the first four months of ths year totaled Us$63.3 bllon, up 88% from the same perod of last year' (Wall Street Journal 2007a) . in md June, t was revealed that chna's overall trade surplus had wdened to Us$22.45 bllon n may 2007, whch was a 33 per cent gan on Aprl's figure (Standard 2007) .
2 detals of these three WTo cases are found n UsTr 2007a UsTr , 2007b UsTr and 2007c 3 Nether the date nor the sample of newspapers was selected randomly. These were the newspapers that were on the sngapore Arlnes flght from sngapore to san Francsco (va hong kong) on the day of our travel. 6 For detals and analyss of the economc transton n the former sovet bloc and chna, see the papers n Woo et al. 1997. 7 more accurately, the wage of the formerly solated worker n the former sovet Unon, inda and chna would rse whle the wage for the worker n the ndustralsed economy would fall.
